Indiana Law Journal
Volume 91

Issue 4

Article 1

Summer 2016

University IP: The University as Coordinator of the Team
Production Process
Samuel Estreicher
NYU School of Law, samuel.estreicher@nyu.edu

Kristina A. Yost
Jones Day, kyost@jonesday.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Educational Administration and Supervision Commons, Intellectual Property Law
Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Estreicher, Samuel and Yost, Kristina A. (2016) "University IP: The University as Coordinator of the Team
Production Process," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91 : Iss. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol91/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

University IP: The University as Coordinator of the Team
Production Process
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & KRISTINA A. YOST*
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1082
I. FACULTY RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS ................................................................... 1082
A. EMPLOYEE PATENT RIGHTS .................................................................. 1082
B. UNIVERSITY FACULTY PATENT RIGHTS ................................................ 1084
II. UNIVERSITY PATENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES ....................... 1085
A. UNIVERSITY PATENT OWNERSHIP ......................................................... 1085
B. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT ........................................................................... 1087
C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ...................................................................... 1088
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FACULTY OWNERSHIP ...................................... 1090
A. ARE UNIVERSITIES PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN MAXIMIZING REVENUE
RATHER THAN FACILITATING EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER? ........ 1091
B. ARE FACULTY MEMBERS IN THE BEST POSITION TO LICENSE
THEIR OWN INVENTIONS? ......................................................................... 1093
C. DO UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES SLOW DOWN THE
COMMERCIALIZATION PROCESS? ............................................................... 1093
D. DOES UNIVERSITY OWNERSHIP DISTORT THE DIRECTION OF
ACADEMIC RESEARCH? ............................................................................. 1095
E. WILL FACULTY OWNERSHIP LEAD TO MORE AND
BETTER INVENTIONS? ................................................................................ 1096
F. WILL FACULTY OWNERSHIP HELP UNIVERSITIES RETAIN FACULTY? ... 1097
IV. INSUFFICIENT CASE FOR CHANGE ................................................................. 1098
A. UNIVERSITIES OWN FACULTY INVENTIONS AS PART OF A MISSION TO
ADVANCE FACULTY RESEARCH AND THE COMMON GOOD AS
COORDINATOR OF A TEAM PRODUCTION PROCESS .................................... 1098
B. POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.............................................. 1099
C. FRAGMENTING OWNERSHIP AMONG MULTIPLE FACULTY MEMBERS
WILL COMPLICATE LICENSING .................................................................. 1100
D. DIFFICULTY WITH BAYH-DOLE COMPLIANCE ....................................... 1101
E. ALLOWING THE POSSIBILITY OF FACULTY OWNERSHIP WOULD
LIKELY NOT CHANGE THE OVERALL RESULT ........................................... 1101
F. TREND TOWARD WORLDWIDE REPLICATION OF U.S. SYSTEM .............. 1102
CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS .................................................. 1103

† Copyright © 2016 Samuel Estreicher and Kristina A. Yost. All rights are reserved.
* The authors are, respectively, Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director,
Center for Labor and Employment Law, New York University; and associate attorney, Jones
Day (New York). We benefited greatly from comments by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and
Katherine Strandburg of NYU Law, William B. Bonvillian, director of M.I.T.’s Washington
office, Lita L. Nelsen of M.I.T.’s technology transfer office, and Mark Righter of NYU’s legal
department. Any surviving mistakes should be laid at our feet. We also acknowledge the
research assistance of David Yin (NYU Law 2014).

1082

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:1081

INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on intellectual property (IP) issues in the university setting.
Often, universities require faculty who have been hired in whole or in part to invent
to assign inventions created within the scope of their employment to the university.
In addition, the most effective way to secure compliance with the Bayh-Dole Act,1
which deals with ownership of inventions involving federally funded research, is for
the university to take title to such inventions. Failure to specify who has title can
result in title passing to the government. Once the university asserts ownership, it
then decides whether to process a patent application, and if it does, whether to pursue
options for commercialization—frequently including licensing the invention to
industry.
A number of academics and other commentators have contended that it would be
more efficient and fair to allow faculty to own the rights to their own inventions,
even if they have been hired in part to invent and the inventions are created within
the scope of employment. The debate, it should be noted, is only over the appropriate
default rule. Not even critics of the current institutional default rule would object to
faculty assignment of ownership rights to the university. Since faculty are not
generally in a good position to pursue commercialization on their own, the question
for public policy is whether the university or some other entity should, in the first
instance, manage the commercialization process.
This Article evaluates the case for changing the ownership default rule. First, we
provide background on patent rights in the employment setting and how patent rights
are applied in a university environment. Second, we explain how most universities
handle faculty inventions and technology transfer. Third, we lay out and challenge
some of the key arguments critics have offered in support of faculty control of patent
rights. Finally, we suggest that faculty inventions that use university resources,
including personnel such as graduate and postdoctoral students, are best viewed as a
product of a team production process rather than solely as the invention of the faculty
member and that the university generally is the more efficient manager of
commercialization efforts.
I. FACULTY RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS
A. Employee Patent Rights
In general, employees have the right to own their inventions unless they are hired
or assigned to do inventive work. In contrast, employees hired or assigned to do
inventive work are considered to have assigned all patent rights to their employers.2
As explained by the Supreme Court in 1933, the rationale is as follows:

1. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200–12 (2012)).
2. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933); RESTATEMENT
OF EMP’T LAW § 8.09(b) (2015). One of us (Estreicher) served as the Chief Reporter of the
Restatement.
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One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term
of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer
any patent obtained. The reason is that he has only produced that which
he was employed to invent. His invention is the precise subject of the
contract of employment. A term of the agreement necessarily is that what
he is paid to produce belongs to his paymaster. On the other hand, if the
employment be general, albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the
performance of which the employee conceived the invention for which
he obtained a patent, the contract is not so broadly construed as to require
an assignment of the patent.3
Even if an employee is not hired or assigned to invent, the employer and employee
can enter into a reasonable agreement to assign patent rights to inventions created
during the employee’s employment with the employer.4 If an employee is not hired
or assigned to do inventive work, the agreement may be limited to requiring the
employee to assign patents to inventions created during work time or using the
employer’s resources, or that relate to the employer’s line of business.5 Such
agreements, if properly limited, are enforceable.

3. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187 (citation omitted).
4. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.11; see, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal. Rptr.
828 (Ct. App. 1986) (enforcing employee agreement to assign invention to employer where
invention was within the scope of employer’s business and the employee used company
personnel in developing it).
5. A number of states have enacted statutes allowing for employee assignment of
inventions under similar conditions. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (West 2011) (“(a) Any
provision in an employment agreement which provides that an employee shall assign, or offer
to assign, any of his or her rights in an invention to his or her employer shall not apply to an
invention that the employee developed entirely on his or her own time without using the
employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information except for those
inventions that either: (1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice of the
invention to the employer’s business, or actual or demonstrably anticipated research or
development of the employer; or (2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the
employer.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 805 (2013) (“Any provision in an employment
agreement which provides that the employee shall assign or offer to assign any of the
employee’s rights in an invention to the employee’s employer shall not apply to an invention
that the employee developed entirely on the employee’s own time without using the employer’s
equipment, supplies, facility or trade secret information, except for those inventions that (1)
Relate to the employer’s business or actual or demonstrably anticipated research or
development; or (2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the employer. To the
extent a provision in an employment agreement purports to apply to the type of invention
described, it is against the public policy of this State and is unenforceable. An employer may
not require a provision of an employment agreement made unenforceable under this section as
a condition of employment or continued employment.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-130 (2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-57.1–2 (West 2012);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.140–150 (West 2008).
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B. University Faculty Patent Rights
Under the general framework applied to inventions of employees, the inquiry that
determines whether faculty members own the rights to their inventions is whether
they are “hired to invent.” There are, surprisingly, very few court decisions
addressing this issue. In Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Foundation,6 for example,
two faculty members conducted research on a specific type of bacteria that could be
added to milk without leaving a sour taste.7 The faculty researchers disclosed the
invention to the university in order to obtain its assistance in developing and
marketing the process as well as securing necessary legal protection (such as a
trademark on the name “Sweet Acidophilus”).8 The faculty researchers sued when
they did not receive royalties from the process, challenging the university’s claim to
ownership.
Although the university in the Speck case had a patent policy, the policy did not
expressly address ownership of trade secrets or trademarks.9 Nonetheless, the state
high court ruled for the university:
[The plaintiff faculty members] developed the secret process for
improved methods of preparation and preservation of concentrates of
lactobacillus acidophilus while employed as teachers and researchers to
engage inter alia in just such research and development for the
University. . . . [T]he University was the place where they discovered the
secret process and . . . the resources provided them for their research by
the University enabled them to discover the process. Under these facts,
the secret process developed through the research of the plaintiffs
belonged to the University absent a written contract by the University to
assign.10
Since the faculty members had been hired to invent, the court reasoned, their
discovery belonged to the university.
Different facts may lead to different outcomes. In Speck, the university was aware
of the research and specifically encouraged it,11 which weighed in favor of the
finding that the faculty members had been hired to invent in ways that other faculty
researchers are not.12

6. 319 S.E.2d 139 (N.C. 1984).
7. Id. at 140–41.
8. Id. at 141–42.
9. Id. at 144.
10. Id. at 143 (italics in original).
11. Id. at 144.
12. For criticism of the approach taken in a case like Speck, see, e.g., Pat K. Chew,
Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 259, 298–304;
Sunil R. Kulkarni, Note, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should Have Complete
Control over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 232
n.64 (1995).
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II. UNIVERSITY PATENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES
A. University Patent Ownership
Due in part to the legal framework that recognizes employee-inventors’ patent
rights in their inventions unless they are hired to invent, many universities have
issued policies on patent ownership and technology transfer. These policies
purportedly assign to the university patent rights to inventions created by faculty
members within the scope of employment, using university resources or funding, or
pursuant to a specific contractual arrangement with the university.13
The policies vary in scope. Some universities seek to own the rights only to
inventions using university resources or funding. For example, M.I.T.’s policy states
that inventions “are owned by M.I.T. when either of the following applies”: (1) “[t]he
intellectual property was developed in the course of or pursuant to a sponsored
research agreement with M.I.T.”; or (2) “[t]he intellectual property was developed

13. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
§
I.C
(2013),
available
at
http://otd.harvard.edu/upload/files
/IP_Policy_12-12-13_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X83-9DAF] (“Harvard shall have the
right to own and each Inventor, at Harvard’s request, shall assign to Harvard all of his/her
right, title and interest in a Supported Invention.”); N.Y. UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2012), available at http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam
/nyu/compliance/documents/IPPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FEQ-RZMN]; OFF. TECH.
MGMT., PENN ST. UNIV., AN INVENTOR’S GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT PENN STATE
UNIVERSITY 15 (n.d.), available at http://www.research.psu.edu/patents/education-and
-training/PSU-Inventors-Guide-to-Technology-Transfer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3698-3B68]
(“[A]s a general rule, the University owns inventions made by its employees while acting
within the scope of their employment or using University resources.”); UNIV. OF CAL., PATENT
POLICY 2 (1997), available at http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2500493/PatentPolicy
[https://perma.cc/YY9B-5NXB] (“An agreement to assign inventions and patents to the
University, except those resulting from permissible consulting activities without use of
University facilities, shall be mandatory for all employees . . . .”); YALE UNIV., YALE
UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICY § 3 (1998), available at http://ocr.yale.edu/sites/default/files
/files/Yale_Patent_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8KH-ZHJA] (“Inventors shall execute
assignments or other documents assigning to the University all . . . rights in the invention . . . .”);
Patent Policy, CALTECH OFF. GEN. COUNS., https://www.ogc.caltech.edu/forms/patentpolicy
[https://perma.cc/SE8J-3FMK] (last revised Mar. 13, 2007) (“[For] [i]nventions made by
employees in the line of Institute duty or with the use of Institute facilities . . . . [t]itle to such
patents is to be assigned to the Institute or, if appropriate, the sponsor.”); Obligations and
Responsibilities of Officers of Instruction and Research, Intellectual Property, COLUM. U.,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa/handbook/obligations.html [https://perma.cc/7GM5-NQDH]
(last revised Nov. 2008) (“Unless it has specifically waived its rights, the University holds the
intellectual property rights to patentable inventions and discoveries, and any associated
technology, that result primarily from the use of its facilities or from the activity of its officers
while engaged in its service.”); 9.1 Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, § 1.A.1 STAN. U.,
https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/intellectual-property
/inventions-patents-and-licensing [https://perma.cc/7EYB-WZMZ] (last revised June 19,
2013) (“[Title to] inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in whole or in part . . . in
the course of . . . University responsibilities or with more than incidental use of University
resources . . . . shall be assigned to the University . . . .”).
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with significant use of funds or facilities administered by M.I.T.”14 In other words,
the university asserts the rights only over inventions developed under a specific
agreement or that involved the “significant use” of M.I.T. funds or facilities.
In contrast, Harvard University requires faculty to assign ownership over
inventions that are “conceived or reduced to practice in whole or in part” (1) “[u]nder
or subject to an agreement between Harvard and a third party”; (2) “[w]ith use of
direct or indirect financial support from Harvard”; or (3) “[w]ith use (other than
incidental use) of space, facilities, materials or other resources provided by or
through the University.”15 The reference to “direct or indirect financial support” and
“use (other than incidental use) of space, facilities, materials or other resources”
suggests that Harvard’s policy facially has a broader reach than M.I.T.’s.
Other university policies speak in terms of rights to any inventions conceived or
reduced to practice in the scope of the faculty member’s employment. For example,
NYU’s policy states:
Inventions . . . are owned by NYU if conceived, reduced to practice or
developed, in whole or part: (1) in the scope of NYU employment or
other duties at or for NYU; or (2) in connection with training, research
or clinical activities at or under the auspices of NYU; or (3) with
[s]ubstantial [u]se of [u]niversity [r]esources; or (4) the [i]nvention is
subject to the rights of research sponsors or other third parties under
agreements duly entered into or agreed to by NYU.”16
The University of Pennsylvania similarly requires
all inventions . . . which are conceived or reduced to practice . . . in the
course of employment at the University, or result from work directly
related to professional or employment responsibilities at the University,
or from work carried out on University time, or at University expense, or
with substantial use of university resources . . . are the property of the
University, effective immediately as of the time such inventions are
conceived or reduced to practice.17
Some policies seem broader still. For example, Yale University’s policy requires
assignment of all inventions of university employees unless the “University
determines that an invention . . . is unrelated to the activities for which the individual
is employed and has not involved the use of University facilities.”18
Some universities require faculty members to execute an agreement as a term or
condition of employment assigning all such inventions to the university. For

14. Part 2: MIT Policy Statements, 2.1 Patent and Copyright Ownership Policy
Statement, M.I.T. TECH. LICENSING OFF., http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part2
[https://perma.cc/PK7F-2XEF] (last updated 2015).
15. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 13, § I.A.
16. N.Y. UNIV., supra note 13, § III.A.1.
17. UNIV. OF PA., PATENT AND TANGIBLE RESEARCH PROPERTY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA § 2.0 (2010), available at
http://www.upenn.edu/research/RevisedPatentPolicy5-19-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/F53Y-SNMP].
18. YALE UNIV., supra note 13, § 6.
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example, Caltech requires its faculty members to sign a patent and copyright
agreement19 stating as follows:
I will notify the Institute promptly of all inventions or copyrightable
materials that I have developed in the course of my duties at or for the
Institute . . . or with any use of facilities owned or managed by the
Institute. I agree to assign, and hereby do assign, to the Institute all such
inventions . . . .20
Other universities, such as Harvard, do not require the faculty member to actually
sign a document assigning inventions to the university until such time as the
invention is disclosed and the university decides to assert an ownership right.21
Typically, universities do not own the patent rights to inventions created either pursuant to
an outside consulting arrangement or outside the scope of the faculty member’s employment.
B. The Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act22 alters the traditional division of IP rights in the university
setting. Prior to Bayh-Dole, there was no uniform law that governed who had
ownership rights to inventions from federally funded research. Each agency had its
own regulations, but ownership of inventions resulting from federally funded
research typically belonged to the government.23 The individual inventor had no right
to assign his inventions to third parties because title to the invention vested in the
government.24 The government often licensed rights to use patents on a nonexclusive

19. Patent Policy, supra note 13 (“All Institute employees shall sign a Patent and
Copyright Agreement assigning their rights to patents or inventions that they may make in the
line of their duties, or with any use of Institute facilities, to the Institute or, if appropriate, its
sponsor.”).
20. California Institute of Technology Patent and Copyright Agreement, CALTECH OFF.
GEN. COUNS., https://www.ogc.caltech.edu/forms/patentagreement [https://perma.cc/9D36
-SMP2] (last revised Mar. 1, 2012). M.I.T., Penn State, the University of California, and the
University of Pennsylvania also appear to require faculty to sign an agreement assigning
inventions to the university at the commencement of employment. See Part 5: Faculty,
Student, Staff and Visitor Obligations, 5.0 General Policy, M.I.T. TECH. LICENSING OFF.,
http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part5 [https://perma.cc/6JA5-NZWH] (last updated
2015) (stating M.I.T.’s requirement); Faculty Consulting Agreements, PENNSTATE,
http://www.research.psu.edu/patents/policies/faculty-consulting-agreements [https://perma.cc/T6T9
-9QW2] (last modified Jan. 11, 2013) (describing the requirements of Penn State’s Intellectual
Property Agreement); UNIV. OF CAL., supra note 13, at 2 (mandating assignment agreements
at the University of California); UNIV. OF PA., supra note 17, § 2.1.1 (mandating participation
agreements at the University of Pennsylvania).
21. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 13, § I.C (“Harvard shall have the right to own and each
Inventor, at Harvard’s request, shall assign to Harvard all of his/her right, title and interest in
a Supported Invention.” (emphasis added)).
22. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200–12 (2012)).
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 2 (1979).
24. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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basis, which resulted in private companies having diminished interest in
commercially developing any inventions.25
Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 with the goal of promoting the
commercialization of inventions that develop as the result of federal financial
support. 26 The legislation provides that a federal “contractor,” defined as “any
person, small business firm, or nonprofit organization that is a party to a funding
agreement,”27 may “elect to retain title to any subject invention.”28 A “subject
invention” is defined as “any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually
reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement.”29 Thus,
after Bayh-Dole, on federally funded projects, the university, which is a party to the
funding agreement, has the right to retain title in any subject invention.
If the federal contractor—in this context, the university—fails to comply with certain
obligations under the Act, the federal government may receive title to a subject invention.
The government also has other rights: the agency that granted the federal funds receives
a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice . . . [the] subject
invention”30 and “march-in rights” where, under certain circumstances, it can grant a
license to a responsible third party.31 In addition, where the contractor does not elect to
retain title, the government may grant requests for retention of rights by the inventor.32
The issue before the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.33 was whether under Bayh-Dole
title to “subject” (i.e., federally funded) inventions automatically vests in universities
or whether the Act simply gives universities the right to contract for such title. The
Court held that Bayh-Dole does not alter the prior common law and does not itself
give universities title in such inventions; if they do not have title as a matter of
common law, they must contract with the faculty inventors in order to obtain title on
subject inventions.34 Thus, in the wake of Roche, it has become even more critical
for universities to ensure that their faculty members properly assign rights in any
inventions conceived as a result of federal funding to the universities.
C. Technology Transfer
Subsequent to the passage of Bayh-Dole, many large research universities have
developed technology transfer offices to manage the process of reviewing faculty

25. See, e.g., The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 185 (1979).
26. Michael Sweeney, Comment, Correcting Bayh-Dole’s Inefficiencies for the
Taxpayer, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295, 295 (2012).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012).
28. Id. § 202(a).
29. Id. § 201(e).
30. Id. § 202(c)(4).
31. Id. § 203.
32. Id. § 202(d).
33. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
34. Id. at 2197 (“The Bayh-Dole Act does not confer title to federally funded inventions
on contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to those inventions; it simply
assures contractors that they may keep title to whatever it is they already have.”).
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inventions and seeking patent protection and/or commercializing them.35 Most of
these universities require faculty members to disclose potentially patentable
inventions to the university technology transfer office. University policies differ on
the scope of required disclosures. Some universities require disclosure of all
inventions created by the faculty member; after such disclosure, the university
technology transfer office determines whether the university has any claim to
ownership. For example, Harvard University’s technology transfer policy purports
to require faculty to disclose all inventions to the university.36 The University of
California and University of Pennsylvania policies are similar.37
Other universities leave more discretion in the hands of their faculty members and
require reporting only certain types of inventions. For example, M.I.T.’s policy
requires disclosure only of inventions that would belong to M.I.T. under the terms of
its patent policy, including inventions developed through sponsored programs, works
for hire, and inventions that involved a significant use of M.I.T. funds or facilities.38
M.I.T.’s policy further affords faculty inventors the option to bring inventions to the
technology licensing office that are not owned by M.I.T. under the patent policy if
the inventor wishes to use the office to assist in commercializing it and receive the
standard associated benefits in return for assigning the invention to M.I.T.39
A minority of universities give faculty members the option of not disclosing
inventions to the technology transfer office and instead pursuing patent protection or
commercializing the invention through other means. For example, Stanford
University generally requires disclosure of inventions that come within the scope of
its patent policy, but allows the inventor to place his or her invention in the public
domain if such placement is in the best interest of its transfer and does not violate
any agreements (such as federal-funding agreements) that are related to the work.40
The University of Wisconsin’s policy appears to be quite voluntarist. It does not
require faculty members to assign their rights to inventions that are developed outside
of federal-funding arrangements or other contractual arrangements in which title is
assigned to the university, instead allowing faculty to retain rights in those
inventions.41 Pursuant to that policy,

35. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Double or Nothing: Technology Transfer Under the
Bayh-Dole Act, in BUSINESS INNOVATION AND THE LAW 52, 56 (Marilyn Pittard, Ann L.
Monotti & John Duns eds., 2013).
36. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 13, § I.B (“Covered persons are required to notify the
University’s Office of Technology Development . . . of each Supported Invention and
Incidental Invention . . . .”).
37. See UNIV. OF CAL., supra note 13, at 2; UNIV. OF PA., supra note 17, §§ 2.1.2–3.
38. Part 3: Technology Evaluation, Protection and Dissemination, 3.1 Disclosure, M.I.T.
TECH. LICENSING OFF., http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part3 [https://perma.cc/HUN5
-AWVA] (last updated 2015).
39. Part 4: Commercial Development, 4.1.2 Inventor/Author Owned Technology, M.I.T.
TECH. LICENSING OFF., http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part4#41 [https://perma.cc
/QZA8-ZVR3] (last updated 2015).
40. 9.1 Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, supra note 13, § 2.E.
41. See G34: Patent Policy, II. Background, U. WIS. SYS., https://www.wisconsin.edu
/financial-administration/financial-administrative-policies-procedures/gapp-numeric-index/g34-patent
-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8ZQ5-588K] (last revised Dec. 10, 1985) (“In the absence of contractual
provisions obligating transfer of all or some proprietary rights in an invention, the inventor
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When, after review by the Chancellor or his or her designee, it has
been determined that no third party is contractually entitled to exercise
control over the proprietary rights in an invention, or that no contractual
agreement exists with the institution, the inventor will be so advised and
will be free to dispose of the invention.42
The inventor then has the option to submit the invention to the university licensing
office or pursue other avenues on his or her own.43
Once the university determines that it has an ownership claim to an invention, the
technology transfer office then makes a determination as to whether the invention is
likely to be commercially valuable and whether to pursue a patent application.44 If
the university does pursue a patent application, it will also seek to license or
otherwise commercialize the invention for further development by industry.45
As a general matter, these university policies envision, if commercial
development occurs, payment of significant royalties to the faculty member and
faculty member’s department to support further research.46 This is also a requirement
of Bayh-Dole.47
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FACULTY OWNERSHIP
The current approach to university IP has been criticized on a number of grounds.
Some critics appear to suggest that it would be preferable for individual faculty

traditionally is free to dispose of those rights in the manner of his or her own choosing.”).
42. Id. at III.G Unrestricted Inventions.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Part 4: Commercial Development, M.I.T. TECH. LICENSING OFF.,
http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part4 [https://perma.cc/8LJ7-4QDL] (last updated 2015).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., supra note 13, § V.B.ii (50% to inventor, 35% is “personal
share” and 15% is “research share,” with remainder to inventor’s department/center, school,
and to President); N.Y. UNIV., supra note 13, § V.B (42.5% of net proceeds to inventor, with
2/3 of remaining net proceeds to inventor’s school and 1/3 to NYU); OFF. TECH. MGMT., PENN
ST. UNIV., supra note 13, at 32 (40% of royalties from license to inventor, with remaining 40%
to Penn State Research Foundation and 20% to administrative unit); UNIV. OF CAL., supra note
13, at 3 (35% of royalties to inventor, with an additional 15% allocated for research-related
purposes on the inventor’s campus or lab); YALE UNIV., supra note 13, § 4(d) (net royalties to
inventor in the amount of 50% on first $100,000, 40% of $100,000–$200,000 and 30% above
$200,000, with remainder to university research); Appendix D—Statement of Policy on
Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products of Faculty Activity, Appendix, II. Allocations,
COLUM. U., http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa/handbook/appendixd.html [https://perma.cc/7LZB
-WHXS] (last revised Nov. 2008) (50% of first $100,000 to inventor, 25% for amounts on top
of that, with sums also distributed to department/faculty, inventor’s research, and university);
Part 4: Commercial Development, 4.8 Royalty Distribution, M.I.T. TECH. LICENSING OFFICE,
http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part4#48 [https://perma.cc/W8TF-8XZY] (last updated
2015) (1/3 of adjusted royalty income to inventor with sums also going to departments and
centers and general fund); Patent Policy, supra note 13 (25% to inventor, with remainder to
furtherance of research); 9.1 Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, supra note 13, § 3 (after 15%
deduction for administrative overhead, 1/3 to inventor, 1/3 to department and 1/3 to school).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (2012).
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members to have the patent rights to their own inventions. We discuss below the
various arguments that have been made by those advocating this approach.
A. Are Universities Principally Interested in Maximizing Revenue Rather than
Facilitating Effective Technology Transfer?
1. Focus on Revenue
Robert Litan, Lesa Mitchell, and E.J. Reedy of the Kauffman Foundation, for
example, argue that technology transfer offices are currently set up to maximize
revenue for the office, rather than act in the interest of the widest dissemination of
technology.48 Because universities require faculty disclosure of their inventions, the
technology transfer offices have ended up, in their view, serving as gatekeepers
determining whether inventions get commercialized rather than simply facilitating
the process.49 These offices are said to focus on finding the biggest moneymaking
inventions rather than those that may be less financially rewarding but socially
valuable or beneficial in some other way.
Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy rely extensively on data from a 2005 study by
Markman, Phan, et al. showing that “[l]icensing for royalties” appeared more than
any other objective in the mission statements of technology transfer offices.50 They
ignore, however, that other objectives such as “[i]ntellectual property
protection/management” and “[p]ublic good” also appear in these statements.51
Since 2005, substantial efforts have been made to widen the horizon of university
technology transfer programs. An influential guide has been the “Nine Points To
Consider” (“Nine Points”) issued by the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM), which sets out appropriate factors to consider in developing
approaches to licensing technology.52 Among the nine factors is to “[c]onsider
including provisions that address unmet needs, such as those of neglected patient
populations or geographic areas.”53 The Nine Points elaborates that “Universities
should strive to construct licensing arrangements in ways that ensure that these
underprivileged populations have low- or no-cost access to adequate quantities of
these medical innovations.”54 Many universities have endorsed these goals.
Universities have begun to embrace, at least at the conceptual level,
noncommercial objectives. For example, Columbia University’s Statement of Policy
on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products of Faculty Activity states:

48. Robert E. Litan, Lesa Mitchell & E.J. Reedy, Commercializing University
Innovations: Alternative Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 31, 32 (2007).
49. Id. at 43.
50. Id. at 43 tbl.2.2.
51. See id.
52. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO
CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at http://www.autm.net
/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/Points_to_Consider.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWY5
-W3ME].
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id.
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University policy does not require that the commercial value of a
conception be exploited to the full; the University applauds the selfless
disposition of beneficent conceptions. If, therefore, the originator of such
a conception wishes to renounce in whole or in part every substantial and
direct financial gain . . . the University will consider joining him or her
in the effective renunciation of all such rewards to either of them.55
2. Focus on Licensing
Again, according to Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy, the technology office’s focus on
revenue maximization reduces the incentives to employ other means of transferring
knowledge, such as publications, conferences, and informal exchanges.56 If faculty
owned their own inventions, on the other hand, they would have the ability to place
their inventions in the public domain if they believed that was the best way to transfer
the technology to the public.57 Martin Kenney and Donald Patton similarly contend
that if an inventor wants to create a start-up to commercialize an invention, the
technology transfer office becomes an unnecessary middleman in the process.58 In
their view, if the inventor initially has rights to the invention, and using the
technology transfer office to license the technology is the most efficient outcome,
then the inventor can still use the office, but if the system is set up such that rights
automatically vest in the university, the inventor does not make the decision.59
Moreover, if an inventor does want to form a start-up to commercialize the invention,
the university’s interest in maximizing revenues creates an incentive to pursue
immediate licensing instead. Typically, licensing inventions to large companies is
less risky and results in more immediate financial gain. Thus, it is claimed,
universities often needlessly steer faculty inventors toward licensing instead of other
goals.60
It is unclear whether these authors’ concerns have been borne out in practice.
AUTM’s 2012 Licensing Survey showed that there were 705 faculty-related start-ups
formed in 2012, which was an increase of 5% from 2011.61 Since the number of
licenses executed also increased by 5% from 2011 to 2012, the number of start-up
companies being formed as a result of faculty inventions is increasing at about the
same rate—suggesting that technology transfer offices are supporting faculty
start-ups with comparable enthusiasm as issuing licenses on such inventions to
industry.

55. Appendix D—Statement of Policy on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products
of Faculty Activity, Paragraph G: Licensing; Authorization To Use; Renunciation of Gain,
COLUM. U., http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa/handbook/appendixd.html [https://perma.cc/NN3D
-ZNKB] (last revised Nov. 2008).
56. See Litan et al., supra note 48, at 44.
57. See Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the
Current University Invention Ownership Model, 38 RES. POL’Y 1407, 1414 (2009).
58. Id. at 1411.
59. Id. at 1414–16.
60. Id. at 1412–13.
61. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY FY2012
HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2013), available at http://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports
-databases/licensing-surveys/archived-licensing-surveys/ [https://perma.cc/L5GS-PGA6].
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B. Are Faculty Members in the Best Position To License Their Own Inventions?
Critics of the current institutional ownership default rule also maintain that the
faculty member who works in the field in which he invents would typically have the
best contacts to pursue licensing. Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy state that the faculty
member knows whom to contact and is more familiar with the overall process than
any university official.62 Similarly, Kenney and Patton point out that the technology
licensing office deals in so many different types of inventions that it inherently
cannot be as familiar with the field of any one invention as the inventor.63 Faculty
members presumably know the scope and potential of the invention and are better
able “to ensure the invention’s proper development from an abstract idea to its
practical application.”64
While it is certainly the case that faculty members have good contacts in their
fields and are often an invaluable resource for the process of commercialization, the
critics have presented no evidence that faculty are better able to negotiate the
commercialization of their inventions than more experienced university negotiators.
Indeed, a principal function of university technology transfer offices is to negotiate
the terms of commercialization of faculty inventions. Individual faculty members, on
the other hand, spend most of their time teaching, researching, and performing the
creative work behind inventions, none of which would suggest any particular
business acumen for negotiating a favorable deal. As a 2010 National Research
Council study observed, “there is no systematically collected evidence that inventors
have knowledge and skills superior to those of technology transfer personnel and
their service providers in the various components of IP acquisition, management, and
licensing.”65
In fact, given that many faculty members have preexisting relationships with
industry, such as consulting arrangements, some faculty members might simply
choose a company with which they are already consulting for commercialization,
even if that company is not actually in the best position to do so.
Thus, there is no evidence at present that faculty ownership would result in more
effective commercialization, and there is reason to believe faculty ownership may
actually result in less effective commercialization where preexisting relationships
will dominate the faculty member’s considerations.
C. Do University Technology Transfer Offices Slow Down
the Commercialization Process?
In a 2010 article, Robert E. Litan and Lesa Mitchell argue that university
technology transfer offices actually slow down commercialization of inventions and

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Litan et al., supra note 48, at 48–49.
Kenney & Patton, supra note 57, at 1411.
Chew, supra note 12, at 310.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie
Mazza eds., 2011).
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create a bottleneck in the process.66 Due to the “monopolistic model” that requires
faculty members to go through the technology transfer office in all instances, these
offices are underperforming; Litan and Mitchell point to the example of output
decline in FDA-approved drugs.67 A better approach, in their view, would be
amendments to Bayh-Dole to require that faculty members be allowed to choose their
own licensing agents in order for a university to receive federal funding.68 In an
earlier piece, Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy discussed findings that the average
commercialization speed, from discovery to licensing, was about four years, which
they viewed as too long.69 They argued that accelerating the pace of
commercialization would provide more benefit to everyone.70
These assertions are problematic on a number of grounds. First, it is not clear the
results would be materially different were faculty able to choose their own licensing
agents. Indeed, left on their own, they are most likely to choose their own university
technology transfer offices. Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy themselves acknowledge that
even though the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the independent
research body at the University of Wisconsin, allows individual faculty members to
patent their own inventions (unless federal funding is involved), nearly all faculty
inventors go through WARF because of its expertise.71 In addition, technology
transfer offices provide an important risk-spreading and social-utility-maximizing
function. Only a small fraction of inventions are licensed, and only a few licensed
inventions make any significant profit. As a result, while a few technology transfer
offices see significant revenues from “blockbuster” inventions, others who are
unable to cover the cost of their own office operations are considered
underperformers.72 Since many inventions do not have the potential to yield a large
licensing profit, a non-university technology transfer office would likely not be
interested in most faculty inventions that university technology transfer offices
support. Thus, “privatizing” these offices and allowing faculty members to choose
which one to go to could ultimately result in worse outcomes for faculty members
who do not have inventions that can be readily commercialized. This suggests that,
at least where technology transfer offices are competent, allowing faculty to choose
their own licensing agent would result in very few changes to the current process.

66. Robert E. Litan & Lesa Mitchell, A Faster Path from Lab to Market, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 52.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 53.
69. See Litan et al., supra note 48, at 46.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 50.
72. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 65, at 46, 79–80. One
example of this kind of service-oriented work performed by technology transfer offices is the
“open-door coaching” provided by M.I.T.’s Technology Licensing Office (TLO), where
M.I.T. mentors students interested in starting a business, regardless of whether they will use
TLO technology. EDWARD B. ROBERTS & CHARLES EESLEY, M.I.T. SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPACT: THE ROLE OF MIT 58 (2009), available at
https://entrepreneurship.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Entrepreneurial_Impact_The
_Role_of_MIT.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EWS-MUG5].
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Second, it is questionable whether the speed of commercialization metric adopted
by Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy is a reliable measure of the performance of technology
transfer offices. The metric considers the time from the filing of an initial patent,
which often happens very early in the research process, to commercialization.
However, further academic research is often needed before an invention can be
commercialized, and this timeline is outside the control of the technology transfer
office. Pushing to license and commercialize an invention that is not yet ripe would
be counterproductive. In fact, identifying the appropriate point to begin the
commercialization process is an important function of technology transfer offices.73
Therefore, the Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy metric both includes significant factors
outside the control of technology transfer offices and, if pushed as a performance
measure, could create incentives for counterproductive behavior.
Finally, even if speeding up the process of commercialization were a worthwhile
goal, faculty ownership is likely not to be the most effective way to accelerate the
process. Individual faculty members spend most of their time teaching and
researching and typically have no particularly well-developed skills for negotiating
licensing or other commercialization deals, making it questionable (at best) whether
granting them ownership would help spur commercialization. A better approach may
be to allow universities with effective technology transfer programs, such as the
University of Wisconsin’s WARF program, to continue to pursue licensure, and
allow other universities with less well-developed programs to pool resources in order
to more effectively and more quickly transfer new technologies. This concept is
discussed in more detail later in this Article.
D. Does University Ownership Distort the Direction of Academic Research?
Chew argues that because owning inventions creates incentives for universities to
direct faculty toward more profitable research areas, university ownership
undermines university policies of protecting academic freedom.74 The effect is
university pressure on faculty researchers to pursue applied rather than basic
research, and in general, to pursue work that is more likely to result in profits.75 This
shift to applied research is problematic because the vast preponderance of basic
research is done in universities and such basic research lays the foundation for
applied research.76
The available evidence does not, however, support the concern that the prospect
of commercialization has caused a fundamental shift in academic research interests.
A committee asked by the Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy
(STEP), a unit of the National Academies of Science, Technology, and Medicine, to
study the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on university technology transfer considered

73. See, e.g., TECH. LICENSING OFFICE, MASS. INST. OF TECH., AN INVENTOR’S GUIDE TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 4 (2010),
available at http://tlo.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/MITInventGd_V5%204-7-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5C5L-EUNB] (discussing how one of the key steps in the TLO’s processes
is assessing whether the invention is ready for commercialization).
74. See Chew, supra note 12, at 305–06.
75. See id. at 306.
76. Id. at 308.
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whether efforts to commercialize inventions have resulted in faculty diversion from
basic research.77 The STEP committee found that “studies using different
methodologies have not found an appreciable change in the orientation of research,
even on the part of faculty members already active in commercialization efforts.”78
E. Will Faculty Ownership Lead to More and Better Inventions?
Would more inventions be created if faculty owned the rights to their own
inventions?79 One study points to the following evidence: (1) when the University of
California increased the royalty rate provided to professors, the number of invention
disclosures went up; and (2) among the universities with the greatest number of
patents awarded in 1988 were universities that at that time allowed faculty to retain
ownership over their own inventions (Stanford, Harvard, and the University of
Wisconsin).80 However, this study may suffer from multiple confounding factors.
First, the University of California was making significant overall changes to its
technology transfer office at the time. Second, many of these patents were filed near
the enactment of Bayh-Dole, which itself produced a large change in the field. Third,
the number of patents awarded at the time of the study was primarily a function of
the size of university patent budgets, which were very low at most universities.81
It is therefore difficult to say, without more work, whether the mentioned
universities received more patents because of their reputation and the caliber of their
researchers, or because of the ownership rule they adopted. Moreover, the STEP
committee that examined university technology transfer in light of Bayh-Dole
pointed to other studies concluding that faculty overall have engaged in more
research as a result of involvement with university technology transfer offices.82 Data
from AUTM similarly show that the number of invention disclosures continues to
increase,83 suggesting that the system is providing sufficient incentives to faculty for
research and invention.
We are not opposed per se to higher royalty payments for faculty inventors or
even university policies that allow faculty to retain ownership. The question is
whether the general default rule for the system should be faculty ownership rather
than the current approach, which facilitates the university’s role as overall
coordinator of the invention promotion and commercialization process. It may well
be the case that giving faculty a higher percentage of earnings on their inventions

77. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 65.
78. Id. at 35–36.
79. See Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 250–52.
80. Id. at 251.
81. For example, legal fees spent on patenting have increased by over five times since the
early 1990s, according to data from AUTM. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, FY 2012 U.S.
LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY (2013) [hereinafter AUTM], available at http://www.autm.net
/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/licensing-surveys/archived-licensing-surveys/
[https://perma.cc/3PXK-7MTP] (based on analysis of AUTM survey data; available upon
request).
82. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 65, at 35.
83. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 61, at 3 (showing 8.6% increase in
invention disclosures from 2011 to 2012).
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could promote more inventions; this is something universities should continue to
consider under current arrangements. We note also that most faculty at the University
of Wisconsin still go through WARF for commercialization of their inventions
anyway, suggesting that it is not the policy but the university’s reputation and
technology transfer efforts that have promoted this increased level of invention.
F. Will Faculty Ownership Help Universities Retain Faculty?
Kulkarni argues that allowing professors to own their own IP will help universities
retain talented faculty.84 He posits that private companies, particularly in the science
and engineering fields, compete for talented faculty and can offer them greater
financial rewards.85 Thus, allowing faculty to retain ownership over their own
inventions will help universities to retain their talent.
Compensation is indeed an important motivator. It is unclear, however, whether
private-industry employment is likely to appeal to faculty researchers regardless of
whether they have the rights in their own inventions. Many faculty members prefer
the world of academia because of the potential for exploring broad types of research
that may be more limited at a private company. Moreover, if a faculty member did
work for a private company, the company would almost certainly require the
individual to sign away rights to ownership of any inventions to the company. The
faculty member would have no option to patent the invention and license it to a
different company that is likely to more effectively transfer it to the public. Thus, a
faculty member particularly concerned about owning his or her own inventions is
likely to be worse off working for a private company than working for a university.
Of course, unhappy faculty may go to other universities. Kulkarni cites the
example of one faculty member of Caltech, Stephen Wolfram, who wanted to retain
the copyright over a computer program he designed.86 Caltech insisted that it owned
the copyright, and as a result, Wolfram left for another university that offered him
rights in any computer programs he created.87 Thereafter, he created a more advanced
version of his original creation, and his new university received accolades as a result
of Wolfram’s creation of this software while he was working there.88
Under the current institutional ownership default rule, universities have to decide
whether they are better off, in terms of faculty recruitment and retention, in allowing
faculty to retain ownership rights in inventions. Some universities, such as the
University of Wisconsin and Stanford, have in fact adopted more flexible policies in
recognition of faculty desires.89 It is not clear, however, that changing the default
rule is necessary to enable universities to take the steps needed to attract and retain
desired faculty.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 248–50.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249–50.
Id.
Id. at 250.
See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
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IV. INSUFFICIENT CASE FOR CHANGE
In our view, the arguments in favor of a new default rule of faculty ownership of
inventions are insufficiently developed and fail to provide adequate justification for
such a change. Accordingly, the STEP committee that most recently considered this
issue found that the current system is much better than the prior system of
government ownership of federally funded inventions.90 The committee further
found that there is insufficient evidence to date that a faculty ownership system
would work better than the institutional ownership default rule, and that significantly
more empirical and policy evidence would need to be presented in order to justify
making a change.91 In our view, this conclusion is justified for a number of reasons.
A. Universities Own Faculty Inventions as Part of a Mission To Advance Faculty
Research and the Common Good As Coordinator of a Team Production Process
Contrary to the claims of many critics, university IP and technology transfer
policies frequently emphasize their goals of enhancing the public good through
research and/or technology transfer. For example, Harvard University’s Statement of
Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property applauds Harvard’s “long history of
benefiting the public through its research programs.”92 Similarly, Stanford
University’s Office of Technology Licensing states that its mission is “to promote
the transfer of Stanford University technology for society’s use and benefit.”93
Further, in most instances, faculty inventions are created pursuant to a group effort
involving the work of other university personnel and, of course, university-provided
resources. The inventions are the product of this team production process. Typically,
universities require faculty members to assign ownership rights over inventions that
were created or reduced to practice with significant use of university resources or
funding. Though some policies avowedly claim ownership even over inventions that
are merely developed within the scope of the faculty member’s employment, it is
likely that even those inventions make use of university resources in some significant
way. Much would depend on the particular facts. Faculty research that does not
depend on the work of other university personnel or significant university resources
is not likely to be the subject of a university technology transfer effort. The stated
terms of the policy may be overbroad in such cases, but a university is not likely to
assert a claim in those circumstances and, if it did, would invite Speck-type litigation
over whether the faculty member was hired to create the particular invention.
As a corollary of the team production model, we should expect that the net
royalties generated from faculty inventions largely go to the faculty member and
further research efforts in the faculty member’s department/school.94 The university

90. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 65, at 62–66.
91. Id. at 64–66.
92. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 13, Introduction.
93. OTL and the Inventor: Roles in Technology Transfer, STAN. U. OFF. TECH. LICENSING,
http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/resources/inventors_otlandinvent.html [https://perma.cc/NXU6
-KV54].
94. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (giving examples of royalty distributions at
various schools).
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itself typically takes a part of the gross royalties to cover its costs and a minimal
share of the net royalties (and even in the cases where the central university takes a
significant percentage of income for a very successful invention, that money still
must be used only for “research and education”).95 Thus, even though the university
retains ownership of the invention in order to facilitate the commercialization
process, the revenue from such commercialization primarily goes to fund further
research efforts.
It is unclear why individual faculty members would object to this type of system,
particularly where they would likely have difficulty bearing on their own the costs
of seeking patent protection and/or commercialization on their own, and where
nearly all of the revenues of current arrangements flow to the individual faculty
members or to additional research efforts by the faculty members or their
departments. These points suggest that a default rule of faculty ownership would, in
nearly all cases, lead to an assignment back to the university.
B. Potential for Conflicts of Interest
A faculty-ownership default rule may also engender serious conflicts of interest.
Many faculty members engage in outside consulting arrangements with private
industry. Though most university policies place some limits on the amount of time
faculty can spend in outside consulting,96 without university protection of IP

95. Id.
96. JULIA MCCALLIN, CAL. INST. OF TECH., STAFF PERSONNEL MEMO NO. 9-3, OUTSIDE
ACTIVITIES (2016), available at https://hr.caltech.edu/documents/9-pm09-3.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8SH9-DMVW].; N.Y. UNIV., NYU POLICY ON ACADEMIC CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
CONFLICT OF COMMITMENT §§ III.B.2, V (2013), available at http://www.nyu.edu
/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/AcademicCOI.2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR97
-62MT] (cannot spend, on average, more than 1 day per week and must disclose all consulting
arrangements); UNIV. OF CAL., GUIDANCE FOR FACULTY AND OTHER ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES ON
ISSUES RELATED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CONSULTING 3–4 (2003), available at
http://www.ucop.edu/research-policy-analysis-coordination/_files/Consulting-Industry-White-Paper
-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA9D-DWM4] (39 days during year for faculty on 9-month
appointment; 48 days per year for faculty on fiscal-year appointment; yearly reporting required
for both); YALE UNIV., ADVICE TO YALE FACULTY CONCERNING EXTERNAL CONSULTING
A CTIVITIES 1 (2009), available at http://ocr.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files
/ConsultingGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/6666-2Q9W] (consulting permitted but only for 1
day per 7-day week during academic year); Appendix F—Columbia University Guidelines for
Situations Involving Potential Conflict of Interest Between Scholarly and Commercial
Activities, B. Establishing General Principles, COLUM. U., http://www.columbia.edu
/cu/vpaa/handbook/appendixf.html [https://perma.cc/RLP8-CPNG] (last revised Nov. 2008)
(can engage in outside activities 1 day per week as long as they don’t conflict with university
responsibilities or mission); Guidelines for Extramural Activities, Associations and Interest
for Staff, PENN HUM. RESOURCES, https://www.hr.upenn.edu/myhr/resources/policy/other
/guidelines-for-extramural-activities-associations-and-interest-for-staff [https://perma.cc/HZN8
-REE3] (effective Mar. 31, 2010) (consulting arrangements that may pose a conflict of interest
must be approved); Policy HR80 Private Consulting Practice, PENN ST. U. POL’Y MANUAL,
http://guru.psu.edu/policies/ohr/hr80.html [https://perma.cc/P52V-SL9P] (effective July 1,
2013) (typically permitted to engage in outside consulting 4 days per month or 40 hours per
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generated within the scope of their university employment, individual faculty
members may be inclined to assign rights in all of their inventions to companies they
are consulting with. Even if the faculty member develops an invention completely
on university time and with the use of university personnel and resources, these
faculty researchers may be motivated to grant patent rights and/or an exclusive
license to a company with which they have a preexisting relationship with, even if
that is not the best outcome for commercialization of the invention.
With university ownership of inventions generated within the scope of university
employment and subsequent commercialization of the invention, the university can
ensure that any company given a license in the invention is the best choice for
commercialization and that the faculty member has no inappropriate conflicts with
such a company.
C. Fragmenting Ownership Among Multiple Faculty Members
Will Complicate Licensing
As the number of joint owners of a piece of property increases, the transaction
costs associated with transferring ownership or otherwise deciding how to use the
property increase.97 Therefore, having multiple faculty members jointly own a patent
will typically result in higher transaction costs than when the university is the sole
owner. Multiple ownership could similarly result in the different owners being
unable to agree on the proper way to commercialize an invention and could lead to a
delay in commercialization, or in the worst-case scenario, failure to commercialize
at all.
Similarly, having a technology transfer office as a single owner of many patents
will reduce average transaction costs compared with ownership of the patents being
dispersed throughout the faculty, even if individual patents were each owned by just
one faculty member. It also would alleviate potential issues associated with multiple
owners failing to agree on the best way to commercialize. These issues become more
significant in light of the fact that a patent having multiple inventors is becoming the
norm. For example, a sample we gathered of 152 recent patents listing M.I.T. as the

month and must seek approval); Statement on Outside Activities of Holders of Academic
Appointments, HARV. U. OFF. PROVOST, http://provost.harvard.edu/statement-outside
-activities-holders-academic-appointments [https://perma.cc/CF2G-5KWB] (last updated
2016) (cannot spend more than 20% of time on outside activities); 4.0 Faculty Rights and
Responsibilities, 4.5 Outside Professional Activities, MIT POL’YS & PROCS.,
http://web.mit.edu/policies/4/4.5.html [https://perma.cc/Y8BL-PUX3] (must disclose all
outside commitments to M.I.T.); 4.3 Consulting and Other Outside Professional Activities by
Members of the Academic Council and Medical Center Line Faculty, STAN. U.,
https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/conflicts-commitment-and
-interest/consulting-and-other-outside-professional-activities-members-academic-council-and
-medical-center-line-faculty [https://perma.cc/CYA9-3MCS] (last revised Aug. 22, 2012)
(must be preapproved in certain circumstances and only up to 13 days per quarter, with some
averaging permitted with permission, up to 39 days per year).
97. See, e.g., Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Fragmentation in
Property: Towards a General Model, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594
(2002).
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assignee showed that 41% had four or more inventors.98 Less than 10% had just one
inventor.99 One patent actually had twelve inventors.100
D. Difficulty with Bayh-Dole Compliance
As the STEP committee considering Bayh-Dole Act compliance concluded:
Compliance with the Bayh-Dole Act’s limitations and conditions on
publicly funded inventions, including the requirement that a share of any
resulting revenue be directed back into support of research, may be
harder to monitor and achieve from individual inventors than from
research institutions accustomed to ensuring compliance with the variety
of federal requirements associated with research funding.101
Thus, if Bayh-Dole were amended to mandate faculty inventor ownership, such a
change might further complicate the process of monitoring whether the monies
generated from licensing such inventions are being funneled back into federal
research, which is a significant goal of Bayh-Dole.
Changing the default rule from university ownership to faculty ownership would,
importantly, require amending Bayh-Dole itself. The National Institutes of Health,
which funds nearly $26 billion per year in university research,102 requires that
recipients of its funding secure assignments of rights in any inventions from their
employees and further provides that a failure to do so may lead to a loss in funding.103
Although it would theoretically be possible to secure such assignments only for
specific projects under federal funding, given the sheer number of research projects
at universities that involve some degree of federal funding, this may be practically
impossible.
E. Allowing the Possibility of Faculty Ownership Would Likely Not Change the
Overall Result
There are at least two sources of data suggesting that allowing faculty to avoid
disclosing their inventions to the university and/or retain ownership of their
inventions would not actually change current outcomes. First, data from AUTM

98. We analyzed 152 patents with M.I.T. as an assignee filed between December 24, 2013
and June 17, 2014. Data and analysis available upon request. Patents Assigned to M.I.T. from
Dec. 24, 2013 to June 17, 2014, USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ27-BUTM] (search
“AN/(Massachusetts AND Institute AND Technology) and ISD/(12/24/2013->6/17/2014)”).
We are grateful to David Yin for this analysis.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 65, at 65.
102. See Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget
[https://perma.cc/RH3H-LF26] (last updated Feb. 16, 2016).
103. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GRANTS
POLICY STATEMENT § 8.2.4 (2013), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy
/nihgps_2013/nihgps_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2FY-7EVC].
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show that the rate of disclosures at Stanford and the University of Wisconsin,
universities where faculty have the ability to commercialize their invention on their
own and/or retain ownership, are comparable to those at other similar universities
that require faculty assignment of inventions. The number of inventions disclosed
per year per billion dollars in total research funding measures how productively these
universities use their available resources. The most recent data show WARF
producing 401 disclosures per billion and Stanford producing 625, compared to a
peer average of 506. In other words, WARF is 21% less productive than average
while Stanford is 24% more productive than average. There is thus no apparent link
between WARF and Stanford’s policies and the rate of invention disclosures. The
pertinent data is contained in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Average number of disclosures per billion dollars in total funding by five-year period
at leading research universities104

Stanford University
University of Wisconsin*
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Columbia University**
California Institute of Technology
New York University***
University of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania State University
Harvard University
Peer Average

1993–1997

2006–2010

515
443
604
514
2018
358
467
414
324
629

625
401
391
496
1193
388
466
186
403
506

*Data for 2006 and 2009–10 is missing.
**Data for 2006 is missing.
***Data for 1993–95 is missing.

Second, at most universities, a very large percentage of research is federally
funded,105 and thus the university will retain ownership for purposes of ensuring
Bayh-Dole compliance, regardless of whether faculty generally have initial
ownership rights.
F. Trend Toward Worldwide Replication of U.S. System
Due in large part to the success of commercializing inventions that the United
States has achieved since Bayh-Dole, many other countries have sought to pass
legislation similar to Bayh-Dole.106 In Europe, where the faculty ownership model

104. AUTM, supra note 81 (based on analysis of AUTM survey data; available upon
request).
105. Our survey of patents filed at M.I.T in the first half of 2014 shows that approximately
60% were developed using federal funding.
106. Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the
Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 316–17 (2009).
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had been prevalent up until the 1990s, all countries except Sweden have now moved
to the institutional ownership model.107
Indeed, according to data from AUTM, university innovation under the
Bayh-Dole regime has resulted in over 5000 licenses being granted and $2.6 billion
in license revenue in 2012 alone.108 The number of licenses continues to increase,
with a 5.4% increase over the previous year.109 Moreover, the total number of
invention disclosures also continues to increase, 8.6% from 2011 to 2012, suggesting
that the current system is resulting in more inventions and more licensing—and thus
increased commercialization.110
CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
Despite our conclusion that insufficient evidence of the need to make a wholesale
change to the current system of university ownership of faculty inventions has been
presented, there certainly is room for improvement of the technology transfer
process, as many critics have suggested. Such improvements could include adoption
of “best practices” by universities for technology transfer, and/or potential pooling
of resources at universities with smaller technology transfer offices.
AUTM has begun the process of improving technology transfer through
dissemination of its Nine Points document, which provides excellent points for
universities to consider in developing technology transfer policies. Nonetheless,
there is more that can be done to address some of the concerns laid out above. For
example, the Nine Points and government funding agencies could further emphasize
the need for universities to expend efforts to commercialize socially beneficial
inventions.
In addressing concerns related to potential inefficiencies associated with
technology transfer offices, one option would be for technology transfer offices,
particularly at smaller universities, to merge in order to provide economies of scale
in commercialization efforts. These offices could be regional in scope, as proposed
by Dov Greenbaum in a 2009 piece.111 Greenbaum suggests that such an office would
be able to review more invention disclosures more effectively, and since it would not
be serving a particular school, may be more objective in assessing the value of a
patent.112 Further, because the office would be larger, it could more effectively
develop expertise.113
A related approach would be to establish, as the University of Wisconsin has done,
independent organizations whose sole mission would be to handle IP and technology
transfer for universities. The organizations could be set up in such a way that they
would receive a flat payment regardless of how much revenue an invention brought

107. Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, LES NOUVELLES, Dec.
2010, at 185, 187.
108. AUTM, supra note 81.
109. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 61, at 4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Greenbaum, supra note 106, at 381.
112. Id. at 382.
113. Id.
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in, and other controls could be put in place to alleviate some of the concerns related
to socially beneficial inventions not being commercialized raised by the critics.
The overall institutional ownership system is generally working well. The case
has not yet been made for changing the default rule to faculty ownership of
inventions developed in the course of university employment.

